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NOTES
PICKETING AND THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
By
HoWARD

I.

FORMAN*

One of the most controversial issues of today's labor relations problems concerns the nature of picketing insofar as it involves or is within the purview of the
federal constitutional guaranties of the right of free speech. That picketing is a
form of free speech, and therefore subject to protection by the First Amendment,
is an infant doctrine of our jurisprudence, having been first enunciated some fifteen
years ago. A number of cases since decided by the United States Supreme
Court have developed that doctrine to a point where the principles and effects thereof are fairly well appreciated today, and have formed a fruitful subject of discussion
by many lawyers and political scientists. Some hold the doctrine to be an imprudent
immunization of private warfare from legal interference, the effect being to inject
into labor controversies a constitutional issue which narrows the usual scope of
judicial control; others hold the doctrine to be a normal and appropriate development, fully in keeping with the very basic concepts of liberties that formed the
political structure upon which our country was founded. The present study is intended to present a brief survey of the doctrine's development and set forth some of
the criticisms pro and con thereof.
Legal Status of Picketing: Before 1937
Prior to 1937 the law was fairly well settled that labor had the right to strike
for lawful purposes, such as better wages or hours, and picketing in connection with
such strikes was an accepted matter. But in most jurisdictions there was no independent right to picket in the absence of a lawful strike, and even in places where
such picketing was allowed the practice was curbed by various police or statutory regulations.' The extreme derogatory view of picketing was set forth by the Supreme
Court in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council.2 In that
*B.S., St. Joseph's College, 1937; LL.B., Temple University, 1944; M.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1949; Cand. Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1953. Member of District of Columbia, Federal
Pennsylvania and Patent Office Bars, Chief, Patent Branch, Frankford Arsenal, U.S. Army Ordnance
Corps. Author, Uniform State and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Temp. L.Q. 145 (1943), 3
F.R.D. 505 (1944), Importance of the American Patent System to the Average Lawyer, 20 Temp.
L.Q. 403 (1947), 29 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 488 (1947), The Role of the Courts in Effecting Administrative Responsibility, 22 Temp. L.Q. 300 (1949), Administrative Law in Pennsylvania: It's Present
Status and Recommendations for Improvement, 55 Dick. L. Rev. 129 (1951), Survey of Natural Law:
A Modern Doctrine of Ancient Origin, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 100 (1951).
The views expressed herein are personal and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting
the views of the Ordnance Corps or of the Department of the Army.
1 Cf. I. Teller, "Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining" (1940) §§ 38, 84-102, 112, 117-20.
2 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
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case, the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois had enjoined defendant!
from picketing the plaintiff and the Circuit Court of Appeals had modified the lower
court's order by adding the words "in a threatening or intimidating manner." This
caused the Supreme Court later to state:
"This qualification seems to us to be inadequate. In actual result,
it leaves compliance largely to the discretion of the pickets. It ignores the
necessary element of intimidation in the presence of groups as pickets. It
does not secure practically that which the court must secure and to which
the complainant and his workmen are entitled. The phrase really reco&nizes as legal that which bears the sinister name of 'picketing' which it is
to be observed Congress carefully refrained from using in § 20." (of the
Clayton Act).

8

With picketing being considered an evil thing by the Supreme Court there
is little wonder that the court found no constitutional solace or protection for the
activity. Since no federal law pertained to the issue, the states legislated exclusively
on the question.The general result was that picketing was conceived to be a prima
facie common-law tort because it impeded the free market, and as a rule it was
permissible only upon a showing of legal justification. Thus, in each court of the
several states, labor was obliged to argue in favor of a more enlightened attitude
toward picketing, but did not make very favorable progress even with the impetus
given to the labor movement by passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935 which heralded a federal labor policy favoring the growth of unions.
Legal Status of Picketing: After 1937
The first important change of judicial attitude came in 1937 when the Supreme
Court decided Senn v Tile Layers Protective Union.4 Writing for the court,
Justice Brandeis in a dictum stated:
"Clearly the means which the statute authorizes-picketing and
publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members
of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make
known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution." 6
This dictum prompted some lower courts to accept it as law and guided theii
decisions accordingly; others, seeking yet to enjoin picketing, distinguished certain
conditions where the right to acquire and protect property were to be weighed
against the right to free speech; and still others ignored the Senn case altogether.6
But the inevitable finally happened when the Supreme Court held directly that
picketing was akin to free speech in Thornbill v.Alabama7 and Carlson v. California,8 both decided the same day in 1937.
8 Id.at

207.

4 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
5 Id.at 478.
6 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 183 fn (1942).
7 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
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It might have been presumed then that picketing and free speech were one and
the same thing, or at least that the former is a form of the latter, but succeeding decisions of the Supreme Court cast the shadow of doubt on this point. In one case, 9
the Court approved limitations which Wisconsin had imposed on disorderly picketing. In another case, 10 the Court sustained a Wisconsin court order enjoining
the picketing of homes. In a third case,'1 the Supreme Court, although holding
that an injunction deprived the pickets of their right to free speech, indicated
that it would have sustained the injunction if the lower court (New York) had
made a finding that the picketing was for an unlawful labor objective. In a fourth
case,' 2 -by a five to four decision the Supreme Court upheld a Texas injunction
on the premise that picketing should be limited to the "area of the industry in
which a labor dispute arises."' 8
The confusion these cases caused after the announced doctrine of T/ornhili
v. Alabama14 amounts to this: Heretofore, restraint of free speech was considered
justifiable only if there existed a clear and present danger of substantial
magnitude to the security of the Government or to the carrying out of governmentAl
functions. 15 Now then, if picketing is a form of free speech, why may it be enjoined when carried on for objectives which, although in some respects may be
considered to be improper, 16 do not represent any such "clear and present danger?"
As on critic, Ludwig Teller, views the situation, this backtracking by the Supreme
Court could not have been unintentional, but rather it was done "because the Supreme Court had begun to doubt that picketing is free speech-nor should there
be occasion to quarrel with that doubt. Rather it is regrettable that the Supreme
Court did not go further and abandon the identification of picketing with free
speech."'l
Picketing: A Form of Economic Pressure
In the Wobl18 decision, Justice Douglas said in concurring:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
thL ideas which are being disseminated." 19
9 Hotel and Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 315 U.S. 437 (1942).

10 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
11 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
12 Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1940).
18 Id. at 728.
14 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

15 Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
(1919) ; and Meiklejohn, "Free Speech" (1948)

16
17
18
19

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47

28 et seq.

Cf. Chafee, "Free Speech in the United States" (1941) 14.
Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 200 (1942).
Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942).
Id. at 776.
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If picketing is more than free speech as Justice Douglas claims, then what is
it exactly? Mr. Teller's opinion is that picketing is a form of economic pressure, this
being so because it does not involve merely the invoking of discussion but ib
rather a physical activity in the nature of a parade or procession which is part of a
boycotting operation. As he puts it:
"...the practice of picketing ...is generally a labor activity carried
on infurtherance of a plan to impede the picketed person's opportunity
to enjoy a free and open market. This differs greaty from the classical
notion of free speech which places an abiding faith in the ability of the
wisely between alternative suggestions after discussion
people to decide
20
and debate."
Considered in this light, Teller advocates treating picketing as not simply the exercise of free speech, but rather as a form of economic pressure whose legality and
enjoinability could well be solved under the law of torts, and according to which
a lawful purpose could logically be required as a requisite for legal picketing.
It is Teller's premise that by not actually repudiating the identification ot
picketing with free speech as expounded in the Thornhill and Carlson cases, and
yet hedging that proposition with the qualifications raised in the Woihl and Ritter'
Cafe cases, an unsound status of the issues involved has resulted. He maintains
that it would have been better if the Supreme Court, when it had the issue before
it in the Ritter's Cafe case, frankly conceded "that picketing is a means of economic
coercion in the nature of a private tort-the exercise of which, even if peaceful, is
a matter of governmental concern.''21
Picketing: A Form of Free Speech
Professor E. Merrick Dodd has directly answered22 Mr. Teller. In Dodd's
view, picketing cannot be denied to be a form of free speech merely because it
may also have the dual effect of acting as economic pressure. As he puts it, our Constitutional protection of free speech wasn't intended to be limited to protecting it
merely as a mode of expression. "It is rather purposive speech-speech which is
designed to affect human conduct-which the Constitution recognizes as a fundamental right. Such speech may be calculated to induce immediate and specific
action-as where one distributes leaflets to voters who are about to enter a polling
28
booth, urging them to "Vote for Stiggins for Mayor!"
Professor Dodd goes on to say:
"The action which the speaker or writer is seeking to induce will,
in many cases, be injurious to someone, and intended so to be ...Widespread conviction that 'Bolivar's Butter is Best' will cause Bolivar's
competitors to lose customers . . .
"Speech may- be constitutionally protected even though it is intended to cause economic loss. There is no logical reason why it should never
20 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 202 (1942).
21 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 532, 539 (1943).
22 Dodd; "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1943).

28 Id. at 514.
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loss
be constitutionally protected where it is intended to bring about
24 that
by methods which may be described as 'economic pressure'."
Further explaining the reasons for his proposition, Dodd argues that since
we have come to recognize the right to strike as being basic to our economic liberty
in our modem world, we,must afford strikers the right to inform the public that
a strike is in progress so as to obtain the public's support by an economic boycott
of the "struck" party. One way of doing this which would be constitutionally
protected beyond all doubt is to insert an advertisement in a newspaper. But this is
an impracticable device for a number of reasons. Many newspapers would refuse
to run such advertisements, and only a small proportion of an employer's customers
would probably see them even if they were published. The expense is another factor.
Professor Dodd agrees with Teller that Justice Douglas has correctly stated
that "picketing is more than free speech," citing the example of prospective customers who would ignore newspaper advertisements announcing strikes, but who
would shrink from passing even a peaceful picket line.2 5 As Dodd has expressed
his views:
"To hold that labor unions and others have a constitutionally protected privilege of engaging in peaceful picketing is to accord them the
privilege of attempting to influence the conduct of A in a manner
detrimental to B by means which are only in part the communication of
ideas. On the other hand, to hold that no such privilege exists is to hold
that labor unions may be denied what is generally the only practicable
method of communicating the ideas which they wish to express to the
persons to whom they wish to express them. It is to deny them the use
of such means of communication even though it may be clear from the
surrounding circumstances that their peaceful picketing is primarily a
means of communicating information and exhortation, and only incidentally something else. Faced with this dilemma, the Supreme Court has
wisely chosen to treat picketing as a form of free speech but to hedge it
with special limitations. The right to free speech is not absolute; and the
right to indulge in conduct which is speech and something more is still
less absolute, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated inCarpentersand Joiners
Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe. But a prohibition of
picketing is under some circumstances, an infringement of the right of
26
free speech."1
(Italics mine)

ThL views of Professor Dodd above enunciated might be termed the "middle,
of-the-road" ideas when compared with Teller's on the one hand, and with the
advocates of unadulterated, all-out free speech as represented by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn. 2 7 It is Meiklejohn's premise that any governmental restriction
of our freedom to communicate our ideas to one another, regardless of their nature, is an abridgement of our right to freedom of speech and as such a violation
of the First Amendment. He sees in the legislative committees, both state and
24

Ibid.

25 Id. at 517.
26
27

Ibid.
Meiklejohn, "Free Speech" (and Its Relation to Self-Government)

(1948).
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federal, which seek to investigate un-American activities, the listing by the Department of Justice of some sixty or more alleged subversive organizations whose
members are considered to be disloyal to the United States, and the President's
Loyalty Order, all steps toward suppression of our constitutional right to free
8
speech. lie maintains that no speech, however dangerous, may be suppressed,2
and in his reflections upon our present status says:
"Our People are, in general, convinced that by authority. of the
Supreme Court, whenever and wherever the 'American Way of Life,'
so-called, is criticized, is declared inferior to some other set of beliefs
and institutions, we are, under the Constitution, justified in resorting
to the suppression of civil liberties, including the freedom of speech.
This disloyalty of ours to our own plan of government, with all its
dreadful consequences, now threatens to run riot through every phase
of American life, including that of government. And, for that threat of
disaster, the Supreme Court, on th-e ground of its acceptance of the phrase,
must be held largely responsible. May a teacher venture to suggest that
the time has come when the court, as teacher, must declare in unequivocal
terms, that no idea may be suppressed because someone in office, or out
of office, has judged it to be dangerous'?
"If however, as our argument has tried to show, the principle of the
freedom of speech is derived, not from some supposed 'Natural Right',
but from the necessities of self-government by universal suffrage; there
follows at once a very great limitation of the scope of the principle. The
guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly,
upon issues with which the voters have to d-eal--only, therefore, to the
consideration of matters of public interest. Private speech, or private
interest in speech, on the other hand, has no claim whatever to the protection of the First Amendment. If men are engaged, as we so commonly
are, in argument, or inquiry, or advocacy, or incitement which is directed
toward our private interests, private privileges, private possessions, we
are, of course, entitled to 'due process protection of those activities. But
the First Amendment has no concern over such protection. That pronouncement remains forever confused and unintelligible unless we draw
sharply and clearly the line which separates the public welfare of the
from the private goods of any individual citizen or group of
community
29
citizens."
If we accept Meikl'ejohn's statement of the alternative possibilities with
which the right of free speech may be construed, in applying them to issue of this
article we would have to determine whether public or private interests are involved in labor disputes. Once this determination is made, depending on whethet
we subscribe to Meiklejohn's view or the alternative proposition he states, we then
could readily decide whether or not picketing, considered as free speech, should be
protected by the First Amendment. It is the present writer's view that labor disputes
affect both public and private interests, a hybrid situation not covered by Meikie28

Id. at xi.

Z9 Id. at 93.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 56

john's theory, but one which would appear to call for a hybrid result such as
protection by the First Amendment in some cases but not others. Thus, we are
returned to the cases and views discussed by Teller and by Professor Dodd.
Conclusion: The People's Stake
The present author will not attempt to state as his conclusion that any of the
three divergent views given above is obviously the "correct" one, for it appears
that none of the arguments are conclusive or self-evident. More than likely, one
will subscribe to one or another of the arguments in accordance with pr'e-conceived
philosophies. However, for whatever its worth, the author will state the direction
which his own views take.
For many, many years, it has been this writer's feeling, as it is evidently
Meiklejohn's, that the right to freedom of speech is one which must be preserved
from encroachment at all costs. But today, upon long and considered reflection,
no reason for this feeling can be explained beyond one of sentimental attachment
and, more important, one of fear-fear that such encroachment would represent
an inroad or trespass upon our democratic way of life.
Enough of that fear remains so that it is impossible for this writer to favor
altogether eliminating the concept of picketing as free speech. Picketing is a
necessary form of communication in labor disputes. The people of our country,
whether they are themselves on strike or are the people appealed to by the strikers,
have the right to know the issues involved in labor disputes just as well as in any
political disputes. Labor troubles are hardly any longer just private matters; they
are the public's concern for theeconomic and social welfare of our people inevitably
is thereby affected. Accordingly, the right to communicate by picketing should
be protected by the best safeguard we have, namely the application of the First
Amendment.
But I do not propose blind subservience to the doctrine that any picketing is
lawful merely because the right to picket is protected as being a form of free speech.
Instead, I adopt Professor Dodd's views that this right is not absolute and, in appropriate circumstances, should be hedged in by special limitations. Just what these
limitations should be cannot in all cases be contemplated in advance of the need
therefor, and so instead of legislating them into existence we must be content to
let the Supreme Court 'establish the applicable principles, case by case, as it has
been doing to date. The pendulum has swung from "no picketing" to "uninhibited
picketing," and now is swinging back to an in-between position of "lawfully reglated picketing." This is as it should be, and in no way is this trend going to affect
our constitutional protection of and beliefs in the right of freedom of speech.
30 Note: Other references employed as source material but not cited specifically herein are: Rottschaefer, "The Constitution and Socio-Economic Change," 179-189 (1948); Feinberg, "Picketing,
Free Speech, and 'Labor Disputes'," 1 Contemporary Law Pamphlets, N.Y.U. School of Law (1940),
Series 1, No. 25; Teller, "The Legality of Picketing," 1 Contemporary Law Pamphlets, N.Y.U. School
of Law (1940), Series 1, No. 28; Dodd, "The Supreme Court and Labor, 1941-1945," 58 Harv. L.
Rev. 1018, 1054-1060 (1945).

